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I. Introduction 
To celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),2 the organizers of the present volume com-
missioned five comparative legal studies of the influence of the two Covenants in 
the (States parties belonging to) five regions of the world: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin 
America, and the Middle East. 
This is a welcome contribution to the new and fast-growing field of comparative 
international human rights law, 3 but also a novel way to celebrate the coming of age 
of the two Covenants. It departs from the approach to Covenant law used in most 
commentaries,4 which barely mention domestic law and domestic practice con-
cerning the Covenants, but also, more generally, from many international human 
rights lawyers' top-down treatment of domestic compliance with Covenant law. 5 
1 Internacional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (opened for signature 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (opened for signature 
16 December 1966, entered into force 3January1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
3 See eg Christopher McCrudden, 'Why Do National Court Judges Refer to Human Rights 
Treaties?: A Comparative International Law Analysis ofCEDAW' (2015) 109 AJIL 534; Christopher 
McCrudden, 'Comparative International Law and Human Rights: A Value-Added Approach' inAnthea 
Roberts and ochers (eds), Comparative lnternationa!Law (OUP 2018) 439. 
4 See eg Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (3rd edn, OUP 2013); Ben Saul, David Kinley, and Jacqueline 
Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and 
Materials (OUP 2014) . 
5 See eg Benedetto Conforti and Francesco Francioni (eds), Enforcing International Human Rights in 
Domestic Courts (Brill 1997); Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law 
and Legitimacy (CUP 2012). 
The Human Rights Covenants at SO: Their Past, Present, and Future. Daniel Moeckli, Helen Keller, 
and Corina Heri. ©Daniel Moeckli, Helen Keller, and Corina Heri 2018. Published 2018 by Oxford 
University Press. 
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Actually, even from a comparative international human rights law perspective, the 
present project is unprecedented in its global scope, its broad focus, and its com-
parative legal method. 
Scope-wise, first of all, while comparative international human rights studies 
have lately become common on the regional plane, either for a given regional human 
rights instrument6 or among them,7 they have been much rarer with respect to uni-
versal human rights instruments. Moreover, the latter studies have not focused on 
the two Covenants in a comparative fashion, 8 but have either encompassed all inter-
national human rights treaties9 or, in a more recent and more nuanced vein, 10 ad-
dressed one of them only, like the ICCPR11 or the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 12 in particular. On the 
domestic law side of the comparison, most of the existing studies have started by 
selecting the States compared according to a preliminary assessment of the effective-
ness of international human rights law's protection domestically in order to reach a 
more fine-grained understanding of the causes of its 'success' .13 This has often led 
these studies to privilege democratic and unitary States and leave aside, as a result, 
States, or even entire regions, where the human rights record has not been so good. 
This is not a criterion of selection used by the reports in this project, which cover all 
kinds of States in each region. In terms of focus, secondly, existing studies have often 
concentrated only, on the one hand, on the influence of the Committees' guidance 
in general (ie their concluding observations, Views, General Comments, and provi-
sional measures) or of some types of guidance only, 14 or, on the other hand, on their 
influence on some domestic institutions only, such as courts in particular. '5 The five 
reports discussed here, by contrast, address the entire range of Covenant law, from 
6 See eg Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on 
National Legal Systems (OUP 2008). 
7 See eg Gerald L Neuman, 'Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights' (2008) 19 EJIL I 0 I; Gerald L Neuman, 'Tue External Reception oflnter-American 
Human Rights Law' (2011] Quebec J oflntl L 99. 
8 As a matter of fact, none of the regional reports in this project have done so comparatively eitl1er. 9 See eg Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein, Treaty Bodies (n 5). 
10 
See Daniel W Hill, 'Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior' (20 IO) 72 
J of Politics 1161, 1172; McCrudden, 'National Judges' (n 3) 549. 
11 
See eg Christopher Harland, 'Tue Status of tl1e International Covenant on Civil and Political 
R!ghts (ICCPR) in the Domes:ic Law of States Parties: An Initial Global Survey Through UN Human 
Rights Committee Documents (2000) 22 Human Rights Q 187. 
12 
See eg Christopher McCrudden, 'CEDAW in National Courts: A Case Study in Operationalizing 
Comparative International Law Analysis in a Human Rights Context' in Anthea Roberts and others 
(eds), Comparative International Law (OUP 2018) 459. 
13 
See Ba~ak <;ali, 'Influence of the ICCPR in the Middle East', Chapter 7 in this volume. See 
also Jasp~r Krommendijk: 'The Domestic Effectiveness of International Human Rights Monitoring 
111 Established Democracies: The Case of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2015) 10 Rev of 
International Organizations 489. 
14 
See eg Rosanne van Alebeek and Andre Nollkaemper, 'Tue Legal Status of Decisions by Human 
Rights Treaty ~odies in National Law' in Keller and Ulfstein, Treaty Bodies (n 5) 356; Helen Keller and 
Leena Grover, General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and their legitimacy' in Keller and 
Ulfstein, Treaty Bodies (n 5) 116. 
i5 Se~ eg Gabor Halmai, 'Domestic Courts and International Human Rights' in Anja Mihr and 
Mark Gibney (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Human Rights (SAGE 2014) 749. 
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treaties through the Committees' concluding observations or Views to their General 
Comments, and their influence on all dimensions of State practice, including legis-
lative or administrative aspects of domestic law. Finally, from a methodological per-
spective, existing comparative international human rights studies have been either 
conducted by international human rights organizations, non-governmental or-
ganizations, or professional associations, 16 or single-authored by academics. 17 The 
five reports discussed here, by contrast, have been drafted separately by individual 
human rights specialists from each region and are compared to one another in the 
present chapter. Moreover, most of the existing comparative studies have endorsed 
quantitative methods18 and actually stem from political science or international re-
lations scholars. 19 The reports discussed here are, but for one exception, written by 
human rights lawyers resorting to comparative human rights law methodology (in 
all its variety). 
In all of these respects, in contrast to past comparative international human rights 
studies, the five reports discussed here provide the first opportunity for a global or 
universal comparison of the influence of the two Covenants in domestic law. As a 
companion to these five reports, this chapter has a double aim: first, to bring the 
comparison one rung up, to the regional level, in order to assess the influence of 
the Covenants on domestic law across regions and identify emerging trends; and, 
second, to develop a pattern of analysis comprising the set of (international and) 
domestic institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that can affect how any inter-
national human rights law instrument influences domestic law. 20 The study should 
therefore be read as much as a study in comparative international human rights law 
as a contribution to its methodology. 
The study's structure is four-pronged. Section II-after this introduction-
clarifies the aim, object, and method of the proposed comparison. Section III 
presents a comparative assessment of the domestic influence of the Covenants 
across regions and, to do so, develops a grid of comparative analysis. Section IV 
addresses the classical issue of the authority of the Committees' interpretations of 
the Covenants, albeit from a bottom-up approach and relying on a comparative law 
i6 See eg International Law Association (ILA), Committee on International Human Rights Law 
and Practice, 'Final Report on the Impact of Findings of the United Nations Hui~an Rights Tre~ty 
Bodies' (ILA 2004); David C Baluarte and Christian de Vos, 'From Judgment to Justice: Implementi.ng 
International and Regional Human Rights Decisions' (Open Society Justice Initi.ati;e 2010); Vemce 
Commission, 'Report on the Implementation oflnternational Human Rights Treaties m Domestic Law 
and the Role of Courts' (8 December 2014) Doc No CDL-AD (2014) 036. 
i7 See eg Christof Heyns and Frans Viljoen, 'Tue Impact of the United Nations I-:J:u~an Rights 
Treaties on the Domestic Level' (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 483; Krommendiik, Domestic 
Effectiveness' (n 13). 
is Universal datasets pertaining to international law in domestic legal settings remain too general 
in focus (eg Oxford Reports on International Law in Domestic Courts <http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/ 
ILDC/oxford-reports-on-international-law-in-domestic-courts> accessed 3 June 2016). 
19 See eg Hill, 'State Behavior' (n 10); Heyns and Viljoen, 'Tue Impact' (n 17); Krommendijk, 
'Domestic Effectiveness' (n 13); Mila Versteeg, 'Law versus Norms: The Impact of Human Rights 
Treaties on Constitutional Rights' (2015) 171 J oflnstitutional and Theoretical Economics 87. 
20 For a regional example, see Keller and Stone Sweet, Europe of Rights (n 6). For a universal example, 
see Venice Commission, 'Implementation' (n 16). 
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argument. Finally, Section VI discusses the role of human rights comparison and of 
regional human rights law in enhancing the legitimacy of the Committees' future 
interpretations. 
II. A Framework for the Proposed Regional 
Human Rights Comparison 
Comp~rative law studies differ significantly in their aims (why compare?), objects 
(what 1s compared?), and methods (how is it compared?).21 Comparative inter-
national human rights studies are no exception, and it is therefore important to 
clarify the present chapter's comparative framework. 
The aim of the comparison, first of all, is the assessment, through a region-by-
region comparison, of the extent to which the Covenants-and their interpretation 
by the Committees-have influenced domestic law, and the identification of the 
institutions, procedures, and other mechanisms that have contributed to that influ-
ence. The main characteristic of the analysis is that it amounts to a 'comparison of 
a comparison': it compares the influence of the Covenants on domestic law across 
regions, but relies on a first-level State-by-State comparison of that influence in each 
region. Even if the interest in a State-by-State comparison under comparative inter-
national human rights law is beyond question (after all, States are the duty-bearers 
of international human rights law), one may wonder about the relevance of the re-
gional unit of reference and, accordingly, about the interest in a regional comparison 
in this respect. 
The notion and role of regions in international human rights law have rarely 
been addressed as such. 22 Regions are not the subjects of rights or duties under 
international human rights law. More generally, they do not amount to an explicit 
legal concept in international human rights treaties and practice. At the same time, 
it is clear that they are much more than a scholarly reconstruction of geographical 
vicinity; they sometimes match the boundaries of regional legal communities or or-
ganizations pursuing political or economic integration or those of a common legal 
culture or system. Importantly, these regions may be either vindicated by States 
. 
21 
See Christopher McCrudden, 'What Does Comparing (Law) Mean and What Should It Mean?' 
111 Samantha Besson, Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler, and Samuel Jube {eds), Comparing Comparative 
Law (Schulthess 2017) 61. 
22 ~ith some ex7eptio~s (eg Christof Heyns and Magnus Killander, 'Universality and the Growth 
ofReg10nal Systems 111 D1~ah S?elton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law 
(OUP 201 ~) 6?0~, most ?1scuss10ns ha~e focused on human rights ,regionalism as yet another case of 
fragmentation 111111ternat1onal human rights law. See eg Eva Brems, Should Pluriform Human Rights 
Become One?: Exploring the Benefits of Human Rights Integration I Integrer le droit des droits de l'~omme: une exploration' (2014) 4 Journal europeen des droits de l'homme I European J of Human 
Rights 447; ~e?rd~d Payandeh, 'Fragmentation within International Human Rights Law' in Mads 
Andenas and Emk Bjorge (eds),AFarewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in International 
Law (CUP 2015) 297; Yu val Shany, 'International Human Rights Bodies and the Little-Realized Threat 
of Fragmentation' (2016) Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper 16/06 <https://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2722663> accessed 31 March 2017. 
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situated within them or labelled as such from the outside. 23 Some States in different 
regions may also share commonalities, but without belonging to a third common 
region as a result.24 
What international human rights lawyers know about regions, however, is, first, 
that there are regional human rights treaties (and bodies) in Africa, the Americas, 
Europe, and the Middle East, but not inAsia,25 and, second, that the United Nations 
(UN) human rights system is organized (especially with respect to membership and 
representation in human rights treaty bodies or at the Human Rights Council) ac-
cording to the five UN regional groups. The latter regions are different from the 
former: they regroup African States, Asian-Pacific States, Eastern European States, 
Latin American and Caribbean States, and Western European and Other States. 26 
While there are overlaps between the two sets of regions applicable under inter-
national human rights law, the most striking mismatches are that, in the latter set, 
the Middle East is divided between Asia and Eastern Europe and Europe is divided 
into two regions.27 
The tensions between the two understandings of regions applicable under inter-
national human rights law can be sensed in the UN General Assembly's Resolution 
64/173,28 wherein the 'five regional groups established by the General Assembly' 
(para 4(a)) are mentioned for membership purposes, but reference is also made 
'to equitable geographical distribution of membership and to the representation 
of the different forms of civilizations and of the principal legal systems' (para 1).29 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, UN regional groups have been reorganized a few times 
since 1945 to reflect changes in UN membership, but also political realignments; 
the latest regrouping dates back to May 2014. There are many other causes for 
discontent with the UN regions, and one may mention the lack of proportionate 
demographic representation, but also of proportionate representation of cultural di-
versity. Attempts to sidestep the UN regional division in the Human Rights Council 
and in other UN human rights treaty bodies have failed, however. This may be 
due to the sheer difficulty of finding a consensual replacement unit-these group-
ings being necessary for practical political reasons-and in particular for fear of the 
other, necessarily more diverse and especially fluctuating ways of regrouping State 
interests in the world (eg along religious lines, such as in the Organisation ofislamic 
Cooperation).30 The first set of human rights regions persists, moreover, because of 
23 See C::ali, 'Middle East' (n 13). 
24 See eg the common law tradition and the Commonwealth, w?i~h includes States in Euro~e, As.i~, 
and the Middle East. See especially the Asian report (Yogesh Tyag1, Influence of the ICCPR 111 Asia, 
Chapter 9 in this volume) . 
2s See Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24) . 
26 See eg UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) Res 60/251 (3 April 2006) UN Doc AIRES/ 
60/251 , para 7; UNGA Res 6411 73 (24 March 2010) UN Do.cA/RES/64/~73, P.ara 4. . . 
27 SeeTyagi, 'Asia' (n 24) and C::ali, 'Middle East' (n 13), which feature a d1scuss10n of their respective 
geographical boundaries. See also the European report (Amrei Mliller, 'The Influence of the ICESCR 111 
Europe' , Chapter 10 in this volume) on the East-West divide. 
2s UNGA Res 64/173 (n 26). 29 See also ICCPR art 31(2). 
30 See Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner, 'Regionalism and Human Rights at the UN' in 
Philippe Lombaerde, Francis Baert, and Tania Felicio {eds), The United Nations and the Regions: Third 
Worl.d Report on Regional Integration (Springer 2012) 243, 246-48. 
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existing regional human rights instruments and the many political and legal impli-
cations of these regional forms of human rights integration in the corresponding 
areas. Of course, these are contingent arguments that beg the question of the actual 
role of regions in international human rights law and of the justification of a region-
based approach given the universal scope of international human rights law. The 
chapter will come back to these questions in Section V.C. 
s.econdly, the object of this study in comparative international human rights law is 
the mfluence of Covenant law on domestic law. The chapter is not interested in how 
other non-legal features of the Covenants influence States in the non-legal dimen-
sions of their domestic orders. Even within these legal boundaries, it is important 
to specify further what (i) 'Covenant law', (ii) 'domestic law', and (iii) 'influence' 
actually mean. 
The 'Covenants', first, refers to the two actual international human rights treaties, 
but also to their interpretation by their respective Committees. The latter may be 
found in concluding observations, Views, General Comments, or provisional meas-
ures. In order to contribute to the discussion of their authority in Section rv; it is 
important to assess how much respect they are actually granted in domestic law, 
independently from their claim to bind. What is meant by Covenant 'law' in this 
study is therefore quite loose; it entails binding as much as non-binding decisions 
by the two Committees. 
Second, the 'influence' of the Covenants on States is assessed only by reference 
to their influence on States' legal structure and institutions, that is, 'domestic law', 
and not domestic politics, culture, or society more generally. This assessment in-
cludes any kind of domestic law and the interpretation thereof, but also any kind of 
domestic legal institutions and procedures, such as legislation, administration, or 
a~ju~ication .. Importantly, legal influence may be formal, as in legislation or adju-
d1cat10n, but It may also be material, as in administrative practice or governmental 
policy. This way, the study hopes to escape the referential blind spot that makes 
comparatists assume that there is no influence when there is no textual or formal ref-
erence to Covenant law to point to as evidence.31 This should also prevent us, con-
versely, from taking the formal recognition and implementation of Covenant rights 
in domestic law as necessarily meaning that they have some impact in practice. 32 
The Covenants' 'influence' on domestic law, third, is understood in many ways, 
even by comparative international human rights lawyers. The term is often used 
interchangeably with 'impact', 33 but also sometimes with 'compliance', 'reception', 34 
' rr . '35 S h h or errect1veness . ome aut ors ave even used it together with other distinct no-
tions, such as 'authority' or 'persuasiveness'. In this study, influence is understood as 
any form of'impact' (on domestic law). It is something that can be described to the 
extent that impact on a normative practice like law can be. The notion of influence 
covers positive or 'successful' impacts (what may be referred to as the 'effectiveness' 
31 See McCrudden, 'National Judges' (n 3). 32 See <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13). 
33 See Heyns and Viljoen, 'The Impact' (n 17} 485. 
34 See Keller and Stone Sweet, Europe of Rights (n 6). 
35 See Krommendijk, 'Domestic Effectiveness' (n 13) 491 - 92. 
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of international human rights law, whether it is intentional and stems from 'com-
pliance' or not) as much as negative ones. 36 To that extent, this study should not be 
confused with an assessment of domestic law's compliance with States parties' duties 
under the Covenants. The notion of influence captures processes as much as their 
outcomes (when these outcomes are positive, they are sometimes also referred to 
as 'reception'). Importantly, and a fortiori, influence should not be conflated with 
'authority', even de facto; Covenant law influence may be explained through reasons 
other than coercion and even through reasons other than de Jure authority, and this 
whether Covenant law's claim to bind is justified or not. As a result, the Covenants 
and their interpretation may exercise a legal influence without being legally binding 
and even without that authority being justified or legitimate. 
Finally, the method chosen for this comparative international human rights study 
is legal. As a matter of fact, the proposed region-by-region comparison relies on the 
State-by-State legal comparison conducted within each region by the five reports 
discussed. 
Because comparative international human rights law is a new field in comparative 
human rights law, a few methodological remarks are called for. 37 This field should 
be conflated neither with a comparison of international human rights law, which 
concerns competing universal and/or regional international human rights law re-
gimes and the interactions between their monitoring bodies without reference to 
their reception in domestic law,38 nor with a comparison of domestic constitutional 
or human rights law without reference to international (universal or regional) human 
rights law in domestic law.39 Instead, comparative international human rights law 
is best approached as a combination of both fields, to the extent that domestic and 
international human rights law are difficult to separate from one another in prac-
tice, as the five reports demonstrate. This is also why it would be wrong to con-
sider comparative international human rights law as yet another area of comparative 
international law. Unlike what applies in other areas of international law and their 
interpretation and enforcement under domestic law, domestic human rights law 
cannot be reduced to the implementation of international human rights law, but is 
constitutive thereof This mutual constitution between domestic and international 
human rights law occurs through the transnational comparison of domestic human 
rights law and the identification of a transnational consensus. 40 As a result, and as 
the present chapter will argue, human rights comparison amounts to much more 
36 Contra Heyns and Viljoen, 'The Impact' (n 17). 
37 See McCrudden, 'CEDAW in National Courts' (n 12). 
38 See eg Burns H Weston, Robin Ann Lukes, and Kelly M Hnatt, 'Regional Human Rights 
Regimes: A Comparison and Appraisal' (1987) 20 Vanderbilt] ofTransnational L 585 . 
39 See eg Vicky C Jackson and Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (3rd edn, 
Foundation 2014). 
40 See Samantha Besson, 'Human Rights and Constitutional Law: Mutual Validation and 
Legitimation' in Rowan Cruft, S Matthew Liao, and Massimo Renzo (eds) , Philosophical Foundations 
of Human Rights (OUP 2015) 279; Samantha Besson, 'Human Rights as Transnational Constitutional 
Law' in Anthony F Lang and Antje Wiener (eds}, Handbook on Global Constitutionalism (Edward Elgar 
2017) 234. 
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than a scholarly exercise, and is a central part of the practice of international human 
rights law (Section V). 
Last but not least, a caveat is in order. The chapter assumes, for practical 
reasons, that the proposed framework of comparison is shared by the five re-
gional reports and that, accordingly, the proposed region-by-region comparison 
(of State-by-State comparisons in each region) actually relies on 'comparable' 
reports. Of course, there are important variations between them. To start with, 
their aims are very different: some test hypotheses or answer questions, 41 while 
others describe various types and degrees of influence,42 and yet another group 
makes a normative argument on that basis. 43 Two reports focus on the ICCPR,44 
while the other three concern the ICESCR. 45 They understand 'influence' differ-
ently: for some of them, it is a form of impact, whether negative or positive and 
hence whether 'successful' or not, 46 while most of them understand the concept 
as a form of positive compliance and in fact discuss the extent to which States 
conform to their duties under the Covenants.47 Some look at all the States in 
their respective region,48 while others focus only on a selection of States, al-
though they select them on different grounds. 49 Some overlap regarding States 
whose regional belonging is controversial,50 while some States, like the United 
States, are not addressed by any of the reports. Some of the reports focus on the 
Covenants' influence on domestic law only,51 while others include politics and 
society more broadly. 52 One report endorses a political science and more quan-
titative approach,53 while the others are more legal. While all this diversity may 
be seen as a problem, the present study tries to make a virtue of a necessity and 
turns some of the reports' specificities into characteristics of the influence of the 
Covenant in the respective regions. 54 
41 See <;ali, 'Middle East' (n 13). 
42 
See the African report (Manisuli Ssenyonjo, 'Influence of the ICES CR in Africa', Chapter 6 in this 
volume), the Latin American report (Monica Pinto and Martin Sigal, 'Influence of the ICES CR in Latin 
America', Chapter 8 in this volume), and Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). 
43 See Muller, 'Europe' (n 27). 
44 See eg <;ali, 'Middle East' (n 13) and Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). 
45 
See eg Muller, 'Europe' (n 27), Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42), and Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 
46 See Muller, 'Europe' (n 27) and Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). 
47 
See eg <;ali, 'Middle East' (n 13), Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42), and Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n42). 
48 See Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 
49 
See Muller, 'Europe' (n 27), <;ali, 'Middle East' (n 13), and Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). 50 
See the African and Middle Eastern reports (Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42) and <;ali, 'Middle East' (n 13)). 
51 See Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42) and Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 52 
See Muller, 'Europe' (n 27), <;ali, 'Middle East' (n 13), and Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). 
53 See Muller, 'Europe' (n 27). 
54 
For instance, the fact that some reports focus more on the influence of the Covenants on the re-
gional human rights instruments than on domestic law (eg in Africa and, although to a lesser extent, in 
Latin America) is an indicator of a regional specificity. 
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III. Comparative Analysis of the Regional 
Influence of the Two Covenants 
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This section develops a grid or pattern for comparative analysis articulating the dif-
ferent institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that affect how the Covenants can 
influence domestic law (III.A). The pattern of analysis consolidates the different 
dimensions identified by the five reports and adds on some mores~ as to constit~te 
an instrument of use for future comparative international human rights law studies. 
The section concludes with an overall comparative assessment and identifies some 
trends (III.B). 
Four caveats are in order regarding the structure of the analysis. First of all, all 
of these comparative dimensions should be read in combination and can either re-
inforce or weaken one another. For instance, the ratification of the two Covenants' 
Optional Protocols on their respective individual complaint n:ech~nisms55 affec~s 
the influence that existing domestic judicial remedies for the v10lat1on of domest~c 
human rights law can have on Covenant rights' protection ;hro~gh domestJC 
courts.56 Another example is the overlap between the Covenants regime and those 
of applicable regional human rights law instruments, and how t~e former m.ay be 
enhanced through the latter's influence on domestic law. 57 A thll'd type o~ mter-
action to be noted is the relationship of mutual reinforcement between the existence 
of domestic judicial remedies and domestic enabling legislation, on the one hand, 
and regional human rights monitoring, on the other; without the ~armer'. the latter 
may not always be able to secure a domestic influence, not to menuo~ an 1n:pact on 
the Covenants' influence domestically. 58 Secondly, some of these d1mens10ns can 
change over time, including under the influence of the Covena~t~ and int~rn.atio.nal 
human rights law in general. This may contribute to undermmm.g the d1st1nct~on 
between the causes and outcomes of influence. For instance, the kmd of separation 
of powers in place domestically or the relationship between dom.estic a~d inter-
national law are two dimensions of domestic law that have evolved m certam States 
under the influence of the Covenants. 59 
Thirdly, some of the features of the comparative analysis are actually requ.irements 
of Covenant law and international human rights law more generally. For mstance, 
having a democratic regime, respecting the independence of the j udi.ciary, ~nd pro-
viding judicial remedies in case of human rights violations are all d1mens10ns of a 
55 First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (opened for signature 16 December 1966, ente.red into 
force 23 March 1971) 999 UNTS 171; Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (opened for signature 
10 December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2016) UN Doc NRES/63/117, 48 ILM 256 (2009) 
(OP-ICESCR). , . a1· 'M'ddl E , ( 13) d 
56 See eg Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America (n 42) and, a contrarzo, <;: 1, 1 e ast n an 
Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). . ra1· 'M'ddl E ' 
57 See eg Muller, 'Europe' (n 27) and Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42) and, a contrario, '>' 1, 1 e ast 
(n 13). 
58 See Ssenyonjo, 'Afri~a' (n 42). . , . , . , 
59 See Pinto and Sigal, Latin Amenca (n 42) and Tyag1, 'Asia (n 24). 
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general positive duty to set up a given institutional regime under Covenant law. It 
is no surprise, therefore, that the positive influence of the Covenants in domestic 
law is enhanced by the display of these features. 60 This may also explain why, at 
times, the comparative analysis comes close to an assessment of comparative com-
pliance with Covenant duties. Finally, comparing (international) human rights law 
is not only a scholarly activity, but also amounts to an integral part of domestic (and 
international) human rights reasoning, thereby instilling a comparative regress in 
the analysis. For instance, domestic courts may resort to the comparison of their 
domestic human rights law with that of other States, including other domestic judi-
cial decisions pertaining to the Committees' decisions and/or to other universal or 
regional human rights bodies' decisions, themselves potentially including compari-
sons amongst themselves and/or with the Committees' decisions. 61 
A. Comparative analysis 
The present section identifies five dimensions that may affect how Covenant law 
influences domestic law: its international law status (Section III.A.l), its 'do-
mestic international law' status (Section III.A.2), the domestic constitutional order 
(Section III.A.3), domestic institutions (Section IIl.A.4), and other domestic actors 
(Section III.A.5). 
1. International law status 
There are many ways in which States qua subjects of international law can relate to 
the Covenants on the international plane. The various dimensions of that relation-
ship explain variations in the influence of the Covenants in domestic law. 
First of all, States' relationships to the two Covenants themselves qua human rights 
treaties need to be considered. The Covenants' influence on domestic law indeed 
refle~ts the degree of States' involvement during their negotiation and drafting, if 
applicable. Another relevant dimension is whether the two Covenants were signed 
and then ratified in a short period of time, and, if not, how long it took for them 
to be ratified and why. If the two Covenants were not signed and/or ratified at the 
same time, it may be interesting to wonder why, as this may affect their influence 
domestically. Another important factor is whether the Covenants were signed and 
ratified at the same time as other international and regional human rights instru-
ments. The national historical context of signature and ratification matters as well. 
It is important to know especially whether ratification was motivated by internal 
(eg decolonization, democratization) or external (eg human rights conditionality, 
occupation) factors, and of what kind.62 Another relevant question is how many 
States in the region have ratified one or both Covenants, and on what grounds.63 
60 See <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13) a contrario. 61 See Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42) and Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 62 See <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13) . 
63 
There is an important difference in this respect between Europe, Latin America, and Africa on the 
one hand, and the Middle East and Asia on the other. 
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Once the Covenants have been ratified, the next question is whether and which of 
the (material and/or procedural) Optional Protocols64 have been ratified, whether 
this occurred at the same time or later on, and why. Reservations and interpretative 
declarations matter too. Besides their content (eg restrictions to the personal, ma-
terial, or territorial scope of some rights; religious exceptions; federal clauses), it is 
important to know whether they have been controversial, domestically and on the 
international plane. They may have been invalidated by the Committees because 
they objected to them, could have been withdrawn, or may have grown obsolete 
in the meantime through contrary domestic practice. Finally, the level of impli-
cation of States in the UN General Assembly or the Human Rights Council, and, 
more specifically, in the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) context (eg reform,65 finances, etc) also matters. 
Secondly, States' relationships to the two Committees need to be considered. A first 
factor of variation pertains to the procedures ratified by States, and in particular 
whether the Committees may hear inter-State and/or individual complaints against 
them in addition to reacting to their submissions in the periodic reporting pro-
cedure. When one or both of these complaint mechanisms applies to given States, it 
matters how they relate to other international and regional individual human rights 
complaint mechanisms that these States may have ratified, whether they are used 
regularly, and whether States comply with the resulting Views or provisional meas-
ures. Regarding periodic reports, it is important to establish how regularly States' 
reports have been submitted, what kind of information States have provided (eg 
merely formal or substantial), whether they have adopted the simplified reporting 
procedure (based on the List oflssues), and how they have behaved in the follow-up 
procedures and in the dialogue with the Committees following concluding observa-
tions, but also, if applicable, in the various default procedures. 66 More generally, it is 
interesting to know how many members of the Committees there have been for each 
State since it ratified the Covenants, how these individuals were selected, and how 
involved they have been in the Committees' daily work (and, accordingly, in their 
reform process) and especially their interpretations of the Covenants. 67 Other issues 
in States' relations with the Committees also need to be considered, in particular po-
tential notices of derogation in case of national emergency68 or retrogressive meas-
ures and their follow-up by the Committee. 
A third relevant feature is the interaction with other international (universal 
or regional) human rights instruments applicable to the States concerned and the 
64 On the ratification of the OP-ICESCR, contrast <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13) and Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 
24) with Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 
65 See the discussion of the adoption of UNGA Res 68/268 (21 April 2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/ 
268 in Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). . , . , . , . , 
66 See the Asian and Middle Eastern reports (Tyag1, 'Asia (n 24) and <;:al1, Middle East (n 13)) for 
the consequences of the non-submission or of irregularities in the submission of reports for the lack of 
integration of regional specificities into the Committees' interpretations. . . . 
67 See Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24), for the consequences of the lack of representation 111 the Committees for 
the integration of regional specificities into the Committees' interpretations. 
68 See <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13). 
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procedures open before their corresponding bodies or courts. To assess how the in-
~uence of the Covenants may be tied to that of other international human rights 
mstruments, first of all, issues of timing (ratification and entry into force) and the 
scope of the respective rights (material, personal, or territorial) need to be explored. 
Starting with the other universal human rights instruments, first, many of them 
have fewer States parties than the Covenants, but their procedures are often more 
advanced and may be used to promote the Covenants domestically. The potential 
overlaps between their respective rights and complementarity between their inter-
pretations by their respective general and specific treaty bodies are worth consid-
ering too. With respect to regional human rights instruments, second, some of them 
refe1: expressly to the Covenants. 69 As a matter of fact, some regional human rights 
bodies have made it a practice to include interpretations by the Committees in their 
own interpretations of their respective instruments.70 Still other regional human 
rights instruments were actually drafted on the model of one of the two Covenants. 
This steers their interpretation by the corresponding regional human rights bodies 
even more towards a parallel with that of the relevant Covenant.71 All of this af-
fects the overall influence of the Covenants in domestic law, especially when one of 
these international human rights bodies issues binding judicial decisions.n Other 
benefits to the Covenants' influence stemming from their coexistence with regional 
human rights instruments may be the individuation of remedies or the application 
of indicators in the context of economic and social rights.73 Of course, the coexist-
ence of the Covenants and other international (universal or regional) human rights 
instruments may not only give rise to mutual reinforcements, but also to jurispru-
dential contradictions and even conflicts and, accordingly, to the limitation of the 
influence of Covenant law in domestic law. 74 Various principles and methods apply 
to the resolution of these conflicts under general international law (eg systemic in-
terpretat~on), .as we will see (Section V). Moreover, it may be the case that regional 
hum an nghts mstrumen ts have worked or still work as quasi-co nsti tu tio ns in certain 
States, thereby benefitting from a privileged position in the domestic legal order.75 
This may either favour the influence of other international human rights treaties do-
mestically or, on the contrary, signal their difference to domestic authorities. 
Finally, another interesting international law feature is the relationship to other 
international bodies and courts whose practice includes or emulates the Covenants. 
One may think of the Human Rights Council, whose special procedures, individual 
complaint mechanism, or universal periodic review (UPR) may include the moni-
toring of Covenant rights for their States parties. Another relevant body may be the 
6~ See Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42) on art 60 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(Afncan Charter or ACHPR) (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21October1986) (1982) 21 
ILM 58). 
70 See Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42) on art 29(b) of the American Convention of Human 
Rights (ACHR) (opened for signature 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 36 OAS 
Treaty Series, 1144 UNTS 123. 
71 See Ssenyonjo , 'Africa' (n 42), on the African Charter. 
72 See a contrario <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13) and Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). 
73 SeePintoandSigal, 'Latin America' (n42). 74 SeeMiiller, 'Europe' (1127). 
75 See Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 
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International Court of Justice (ICJ), whose case law has contributed to reinforcing 
the authority of the Committees' interpretations of the Covenants.
76 
2. 'Domestic international law' status 
Domestic law entails rules pertaining to the relationship between domestic and 
international law, ie domestic foreign relations law or 'domestic international law'. 
These rules affect the influence of the Covenants on domestic law. 
First of all, it is interesting to start by looking at the domestic procedures of a~proval 
that precede the Covenants' ratification. The existence of a procedure of parliamen-
tary approval, or even of a popular referendum on the ~o~enants, matters for their 
democratic legitimacy domestically and hence for their mfluence. Generally, the 
issue of the domesticlaw 'pedigree' (eg constitutional or legislative) of the Covenants, 
where they are enacted as a piece of domestic legislation, is relevant as it may, later 
on, condition the rank of the Covenants in the domestic legal order. The same may 
be said about the existence of a procedure of pre-approval abstract judicial review of 
international human rights treaties, including of the Covenants. Such a procedure 
may indeed lead to the amendment of domestic legislation and/or constitutional 
law prior to ratification. . . 
A second dimension pertains to potential domestic refm-ms occurnng.pnor .to or 
at the time of the entry into force of the Covenants. Some States watt until the 
entry into force to proceed with reforms, or do not p~an any sy~te~atic r~forms at 
all, while others organize them and postpone international treaties entry mto force 
until the completion of the required domestic reforms. It is in this co~te~t, too'. that 
the question of the integration of Covenant rights into the domest~c bill. of ~tgh~s 
(whether it is constitutional or not) or into another form of ~omesttc le~1slatt~n ts 
to be considered. In dualist countries, this takes the shape of mcorporation legisla-
tion, but some monist countries are also known to integrate (some) Covenant rights 
into their bill of rights or legislation. Independently from general reforms or from 
the actual integration of Covenant rights into domestic law, or in a.dditio~ to ~hem, 
some States, although this is rare in practice, have adopted enablmg l~g1slatton. to 
help enforce the Covenants alone, and sometimes also the Committee~ concludmg 
observations, Views, or General Comments, in domestic law. Enabling laws vary 
greatly in content: some only pertain to dom:stic adju~icat'.on, while others even 
foresee special domestic remedies and reparations for v10lattons of the Covenants 
established by the Committees in their Views. 
Once the Covenants are in force, a third relevant issue is the relationship between 
domestic and international law. This relationship is organized around questions of 
validity, rank, and effects, and the same applies to international hu~an rights law 
and the Covenants-although one may interestingly observe a certam level of un-
certainty or even overlaps between these categories in regions other than Europe. 
76 See egAhmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Merits) 
[2010] ICJ Rep 639, 664. 
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In certain States, international human rights law behaves like international law in 
general, but, in others, it has a special status, both in terms of validity (usually imme-
diate) and rank (usually supra-legislative). Some constitutions even entail a clause 
establishing what rank international human rights law, including the Covenants, 
should have in domestic law.77 With respect to validity, some States are monist and 
recognize the immediate validity of the Covenants, while others are dualist and 
have to incorporate them, either into their domestic bill of rights or in a separate 
piece oflegislation, for them to have any form of validity and effect in domestic law. 
Regarding the rank granted to the Covenants in domestic law, States vary signifi-
cantly: some grant them legislative rank, while others give them supra-legislative, 
constitutional, or even supra-constitutional value. With respect to the Covenants' 
effects, States usually give individual rights under the Covenants direct effect 
(whether it is through their justiciability or not, depending on how judicialized 
domestic human rights protection is in general). The rights under the ICESCR are 
often treated differently in this respect, depending in particular on the extent to 
which the direct effect of economic and social rights is recognized under domestic 
law in general. Note that dualist legal orders usually address issues of the rank and 
effects of the Covenants in their incorporating legislation. Finally, some States dis-
tinguish between Covenant rights and their interpretations by the Committees' de-
cisions, and do not grant the latter the same validity, rank, and effects. Some regard 
the latter as binding, while others do not (see Section IV). 
Fourthly, another ground of variation pertains to the relationship between domestic 
and Covenant rights. The first question to ask is whether the State has a domestic 
bill of rights (constitutional or not) and whether that bill includes all rights pro-
tected under the two Covenants (maybe with differences between economic and 
social rights and civil and political rights), as this may affect the significance of the 
Covenants domestically.78 What matters in the latter case is whether the inclusion 
or 'internalization'79 of Covenant rights pre-existed the ratification of the Covenants 
or is a consequence thereof. The domestic bill of rights' degree of constitutional en-
trenchment and its relationship to domestic legislation matter also by comparison to 
the entrenchment of the Covenants in domestic law. The relationship between the 
domestic bill of rights and the Covenants in case of conflict between their respective 
interpretations, and especially their ranking, also needs to be explored. In some 
States, domestic and international human rights are subsumed in the context of spe-
cial judicial human rights remedies or, at least, in regular domestic courts' human 
rights reasoning. This may, in the long run, lead to the levelling-up or the levelling-
down of the protection of Covenant rights domestically, through mutual influence 
between domestic human rights law and the Covenants with respect to various fea-
tures of human rights reasoning (eg jurisdiction and applicability; personal, ma-
terial, and territorial scope, such as horizontal effect; positive and/or negative duties; 
77 See especially Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 
78 See Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 
79 See Versteeg, 'Law versus Norms' (n 19). See also C::ali, 'Middle East' (n 13). 
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procedural obligations; restriction justifications, such as proportionality; rights' 
inner core; and constitutionality/conventionality review). 
Finally, the relationship between the Covenants and other int~r~ational (u~iversal 
or regionab human rights instruments (and, more accurately, their mterp.retat1ons ~y 
their respective bodies/courts) can affect the infl~ence of. the former m do~est1c 
law. This relationship can be approached from an mternauonal law perspective (eg 
conflict rules, systemic interpretation), as in the previous section, but i.t may also 
be affected by domestic law's approaches to these instru~ents. Dom:suc law. may 
expressly or tacitly rank certain instruments (usually regional .ones, w1t.h a regional 
court monitoring them) higher than others. 80 It may also provide som: 1.nstruments 
with more effective judicial remedies domestically after an adverse dec1.s1on by ~hese 
other international human rights bodies. Depending on whether other mternat1onal 
human rights instruments, and their monitoring bodies' int~rpr:t~tions, ref~r .to t~e 
Covenants and their interpretations, therefore, the formers pnvileged position m 
domestic law may enhance the influence of the Covenants. 
3. Domestic constitutional order 
Various other background or constitutional factors in domestic law affect the influ-
ence of the Covenants domestically. 
This is the case, first of all, of the constitutional order itself. The influence of the 
Covenants can vary considerably depending on whether there is a formal constitu-
tion domestically, whether it is entrenched, whether it includes a bi.ll o~ rights, ~nd 
whether it is monitored by a constitutional court and through constitutional review 
oflegislation. . 
Secondly, other more general features of the domestic legal ~rde~ may ~lso affect 
the influence of the Covenants domestically. One should mention m particular the 
recognition of legal pluralism (religious or not) or of other forms of .legal devolu,-
tion and special legal regimes within the domestic legal order. Despite the ~tat:s 
international responsibility under the Covenants, the latter may not be applied ~n 
the same way in all parts of the domestic legal order. Issues of rank and effect, .m 
particular, may be addressed differently in each of them. One should also enqUl~·e 
about the role of the predominant legal theories or cultures in the legal order, and m 
particular legal realism, legal formalism, or jusnaturalism.81 .. 
A third influential feature is the political organization of the State. This mcludes 
primarily the question of its federal organization, ~ith the i~plications t~is may 
have on the ranking and effects of the Covenants m domestic law. The issue of 
(allocation of and potential centralization of) competences i~ federal S~ates oft.en 
interferes with the implementation of international human nghts law m practice 
and can have a chilling effect on compliance. 82 Other related questions, such as 
so Contrast Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42) with Pinto and Sigal, 'Lati~Am~ric~ (n 42).. , 
st See C::ali, 'Middle East' (n 13) on the former and Pinto and S1gal, Lann Amenca (n 42) on the 
latter. 
B2 See eg Krommendijk, 'Domestic Effectiveness' (n 13). 
258 The Influence of the Two Covenants on States Parties Across Regi-ons 
political inequalities among citizens (eg under a caste system or a personal status 
system under Sharia83) can affect the Covenants' influence by discriminating be-
tween groups of right-holders. 
A fourth and related feature pertains to the political regime applicable domestically. 
When it is democratic, 84 as it should be according to the political requirements im-
posed by the Covenants, it is important to know whether it is parliamentary or not, 
whether it grants direct democratic rights, and whether it adheres to a majoritarian 
or consociational system, for all these features may modulate the Covenants' influ-
ence in practice. Other features of the political regime can also affect the Covenants' 
interpretation domestically, in particular predominant political ideologies like liber-
alism, communism, 85 or socialism. 86 One should also consider cultural characteris-
tics of domestic politics, such as their relationship to religion or other forms of social 
morality. Thus, the existence of collective moralities tends to affect the influence of 
individual rights, and hence of the Covenants, in practice. 87 
A fifth background or constitutional dimension that may affect the Covenants' 
influence is the supranational or international integration of States. One may think of 
various forms ofintegration of States, be they economic or political (eg the European 
Union, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the 
Arab League, or the Organization of American States). Some have a human rights 
dimension, as discussed before, that may also affect the influence of the Covenants, 
usually with a positive effect. When these integrated communities of States do not 
have their own human rights regimes and do not refer to one, their secondary law 
(eg on trade-related matters) may affect the international legal duties of States, in-
cluding those arising under the Covenants, thereby raising issues of the fragmenta-
tion of international law. 
Finally, one should mention the role played by structural difficulties. One may 
think of migration, poverty,88 literacy,89 corruption, climatic hardship, armed con-
flict (international or not),90 epidemics, or financial and economic crisis.91 These 
difficulties all hamper, in one way or another, the capacity of States to comply with 
their international human rights duties, and hence with the Covenants. 
4. Domestic institutions 
Domestic institutions and their respective organization also affect the influence of 
the Covenants domestically. 
This is the case, first of all, of the separation of powers. The first thing to ask is 
whether the domestic institutional order employs that principle and how it 
83 See <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13). 
84
, On authoritarian regimes, compare Muller, 'Europe' (n 27), Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24), and <;:ali , 'Middle 
East (n 13). 
85 See Mliller, 'Europe' (n 27), on the Russian and Eastern European exception. 
86 See Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 
87 See Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24) and <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13). 
88 See Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42). 89 See Tyagi , 'Asia' (n 24) . 
90 See <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13) . 9 1 See Muller, 'Europe' (n 27). 
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understands it. It is important to know, in particular, whether the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial powers exercise mutual checks on one another or whether some 
have supremacy (eg due to parliamentary sovereignty) over others, and how. Given 
the close relationship between international human rights law and the Covenants, 
on the one hand, and domestic courts and judicial remedies, on the other, situating 
judicial power in relationship to the other two domestic powers, and in particular 
the parliament and the administration, is key.92 The situation of judicial power may 
affect other fundamental considerations, such as the existence of constitutional and/ 
or, at least, 'conventional' review (based on international human rights treaties like 
the Covenants) and the scope of the judicial remedies that can be ordered. It is also 
important to know whether that constitutional review can be abstract and thus per-
tain to legislation or even constitutional changes. 
Secondly, the existence and scope of pre-legislative human rights scrutiny can also 
affect the influence of the Covenants domestically. Its role is to scrutinize any pro-
posed legislation for its compatibility with human rights law. It is important to 
ascertain whether its scope is restricted to domestic human rights law or whether it 
extends to international human rights law and the Covenants, and to which extent 
it encompasses the latter's interpretations by the Committees' concluding observa-
tions, Views, or General Comments.93 
Thirdly, the existence and scope of executive human rights monitoring is another 
factor affecting the influence of the Covenants in domestic law. More and more 
States have established an ombudsman or a national human rights commission of 
some kind. Some of these have as their mandate to monitor domestic human rights 
protection, but most expand it to include international human rights law and the 
Covenants.94 Establishing a national human rights institution (NHRI) has become 
a requirement for governments and administrations under international human 
rights law and the Paris Principles, and this duty has been monitored through the 
Human Rights Council's UPR in particular. 
Finally, the scope and organization of domestic human rights adjudication can af-
fect how the Covenants influence domestic law. The first variation factor is whether 
domestic courts can review legislation on human rights grounds, adjudicate indi-
vidual cases of human rights violations, and/ or even interpret domestic legislation 
in the light of the Covenants (eg in order to fill gaps). It is also important to know 
which courts can do so (only federal ones, or local ones too; only constitutional or 
highest courts, or all of them). Regarding individual human rights complaints'. it is 
important to identify whether there are specific judicial remedies for human nghts 
violations. Another relevant feature is whether these remedies are open to violations 
of domestic and international human rights law (including the Covenants) alike.95 
Another question is whether Covenant rights are applied as such or in light of their 
interpretation in the Committees' concluding observations, Views, or General 
Comments and, in the latter case, whether these interpretations are only referred to 
9 2 See Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 93 See Muller, 'Europe' (n 27) . 
94 ibid. 
95 Contrast Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42) and Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42) in this respect. 
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when they pertain to the State in question or to any State (so-called erga omnes ef-
fect). The question of'judicial' or 'quasi-judicial' dialogue between domestic courts 
and the Committees may be raised in this context. Regarding domestic courts' rea-
soning, it may be interesting to assess how comparative it is, whether across domestic 
human rights law or between international (universal and/or regional) human rights 
law and domestic human rights law. AB explained previously, it is relevant to identify 
whether domestic courts merge domestic and Covenant rights in their reasoning, 
and what this leads to with respect to various issues such as jurisdiction, scope, re-
strictions, or remedies. More generally, it is interesting to ascertain what areas of 
domestic human rights adjudication are most influenced by Covenant rights and 
their interpretations. 
Interestingly, some States have introduced special remedies that apply following 
a violation of Covenant rights (usually as established in adverse Views by the 
Committees), often in their domestic legislation incorporating the Covenants or 
facilitating their enforcement in domestic law. These remedies may be prescribed 
specifically, such as, for instance, to order the reopening of the domestic judicial 
procedure that led to the violation or to fast-track remedial orders when the viola-
tion stems from domestic legislation. In most cases, however, it is up to domestic 
judges to remedy the situation within the constraints of the separation of powers 
and the domestic constitutional order. Pre-existing domestic judicial remedies of 
this kind help compensate for the lack of binding nature of the Committees' Views. 
The absence of such remedies in domestic law explains, for instance, why the most 
that victims can expect from governments after adverse Views of the Committees 
are often ex gratia payments. 
5. Other domestic actors 
The role of other domestic actors also affects the influence of the Covenants 
domestically. 
A first set of such actors are political parties and lobbies. Some have placed inter-
national human rights law, and the Covenants, at the core of their political mandate 
and project. This is often the case of opposition parties,96 but not only. 
A second group of relevant domestic actors are non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). Some are national, while others are regional or even universal in scope. 
NGOs may contribute to the influence of international human rights law and the 
Covenants, both in domestic and international institutions and procedures, but 
also through sensibilization work with civil society.97 Their contribution may be 
felt in the legislature, but also in the judicial process through representation, fact-
finding, or third-party interventions. The Committees have long associated NGOs 
with the follow-up process and the reporting procedure in general, and this has 
96 See Muller, 'Europe' (n 27). 
97 See Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24); Patrick Mutzenberg, 'NGOs: Essential Actors for Embedding the 
Covenants in the National Context', Chapter 5 in this volume. 
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contributed, when these NGOs also have a strong foothold domestically, to enhan-
cing the Covenants' influence in domestic law. 
A third relevant domestic actor for the influence of the Covenants in domestic law 
is academia or scholarship. Its influence can occur through research and publications, 
but also through teaching, professional training, and academic conferences. All of 
these avenues can potentially include Covenant law and contribute to its dissemin-
ation in the domestic legal order.98 Other important factors are the translation of 
the Committees' decisions into local languages or the development of databases per-
taining to Covenant law, as these are often academic projects. One_ may also menti?n 
other kinds of advanced training in Covenant law, be they orgamzed together with 
the bar or other professional associations. 
Finally, the role of the media on the influence of the Covenants in domestic law 
needs to be assessed in each State. Regular coverage ofViews or General Comments 
can help remind domestic lawyers and human rights-holders about the Covenants.99 
B. An overall assessment: Four trends and five needs 
There are four trends that emerge clearly from the comparative analysis of the influ-
ence of the Covenants in domestic law across the five regions examined. 
First of all, the existence of preventive domestic legislation and/ or remedial judi-
cial remedies enforcing Covenant rights enhances their domestic influence. In that 
context, what matters especially is the relationship between the legislature (and/ 
or administration) and the judiciary, and especially the existence of a separation of 
powers and mutual checks between them. This is confirmed by all reports, either 
positively in Europe and Latin America100 or negatively in Africa. 101 Importa~tly, 
ratification of the two Optional Protocols on the individual complaint mechamsm 
enhances the influence that existing judicial remedies for the violation of domestic 
human rights law can have on Covenant rights protection through domestic courts. 
This is echoed in the reports' findings on Latin America102 and, a contrario, on the 
Middle East and&ia. 103 
Secondly, the overlap between the Covenants and regional human rights law 
instruments, and their monitoring bodies, enhances the farmer's influence in do-
mestic law. The reports confirm this in Europe and Latin America, 104 but also, a 
contrario, in ft.Bia and the Middle East. 105 Interestingly, however, in the absence 
of domestic enabling legislation and judicial remedies specifically dedicated to the 
Covenants, the existence of a regional human rights monitoring system, including 
a system that includes the Committees' interpretations into its regional body's own 
98 Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). 99 See Muller, 'Europe' (n 27) . 
loo See Muller, 'Europe' (n 27) and Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 
101 See Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42). 102 See Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 
103 See <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13) and Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). 
104 See Muller, 'Europe' (n 27) and Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 
105 See Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24) and <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13). 
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interpretations, does not necessarily suffice to secure domestic influence, as con-
firmed in the African report. 106 
Thirdly, the Covenant's influence in domestic law depends to a great extent on 
political (and judicial) culture. It requires more than proforma legal protection of 
Coven.ant rights,. in other words. 107 All of the reports confirm this, but especially 
the Asian and Middle Eastern ones, 108 which emphasize the lack of political will in 
some of the States in these regions and hence also the lack of constructive interaction 
with the Committees. 
Finally, the Covenants' influence in domestic law is enhanced when the political 
and institutional requirements that stem from general positive duties arising under 
Covenant rights are fulfilled. All reports confirm the importance of democracy, con-
stitutionalism, and judicial review for the Covenants' influence. This is especially 
. L . A . 109 b h 1 true in atin menca, ut t e same cone usion may also be drawn from the 
Middle Eastern report a contrario. 110 
Generally, among the main directions for future reform that one may identify 
from the reports, one should mention the following five. 
A first set of needs includes human rights education and information and, more 
specific~lly, the development of databases pertaining to Covenant law domestically 
and regionally. 111 A second common concern is the need for heightened sensitivity 
to moral (and religious) pluralism, and the legal diversity that stems from it across 
regions, at the risk of otherwise alienating some States from the Covenants and the 
Committees. 112 Thirdly, there is a need for more (demographic or cultural) propor-
tionate representation in the Committees.113 A fourth concern pertains to the need 
for new means of constructive dialogue and/or pressure by the Committees on States 
that do not provide information or only do so pro forma. 114 Finally, and more gener-
ally, there is a call for more 1·esources as the price of better human rights protection. 11 5 
IV. A Comparative Law Argument for the Authority 
of the Committees' Interpretations 
The (legal) authority or binding nature of the Committees' interpretations of the 
two Covenants ~concluding observations, Views, and General Comments) has long 
been controversial. Instead of approaching the issue in the traditional way and top-
down as a compliance problem, that is, from the perspective of the Committees, 
whose authority to settle the question is as controversial as their authority to inter-
pret the Covenants in the first place, comparative international human rights law 
106 See Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42). 107 ibid. 
108 SeeTyagi, 'Asia' (n 24) and <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13). 
109 See Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42). 110 See <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13). 
111 See Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42), Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24), and <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13). 
112 See Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). 11 3 ibid. 
114 SeeTyagi, 'Asia' (n 24) and <;:ali, 'Middle East' (n 13). 
115 See Ssenyonjo, 'Africa' (n 42), Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42) and Muller 'Europe' 
(n27). ' ' 
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provides an opportunity to look at it differently, that is, bottom-up and from the 
perspective of States. . . . 
As a matter of fact, most of the decisive arguments advanced in the d1scuss10ns to 
date stem from general international law, and in particular from the international 
law on sources and on responsibility. Interestingly, these customary rules and general 
principles arise from State practice. It is the very kind of topic in international la:", 
therefore, regarding which comparative international law can amou~t to an essential 
resource: it enables us to map State practice and identify a transnational consensus 
on the matter. 
This comparative approach fits the issue of authority very well. l.t is a questi?n 
whose treatment, as legal philosophers have long realized,. shoul~ b.ndge ~h~ soc~o­
logical and normative realms. I 16 It suffices to stress how d~fficult it 1s to. d1stingu1sh 
the duty to obey from the practice of obeying, or the claim to authonty fror:1 the 
exercise of authority, and, more generally, to decide what comes first: the c~a1m or 
the practice.117 Given that the kind of sociological data re~uired to se~tle this ques-
tion cannot but be domestic, since international human nghts law binds States to 
individuals under their jurisdiction, the comparison of domestic human rights law 
and practice has to be central to the elucidation of the authority of the Committees' 
interpretations of the Covenants. . 
Scope precludes rehearsing the debate pertaining to the authonty of the 
Committees' interpretations of the Covenants. 118 In short, like any other inte:-
national treaty, the two Covenants are binding international law. The problem is 
that the interpretations of the treaties given by the two Committees were expressly 
considered as non-binding by the two treaties. This is evidenced by the terms used, 
such as 'views', 'observations', 'comments', or 'recommendations'. 
Unsurprisingly, the Committees have distanced themselv~s from this starting 
point by referring to the good faith obligations of States pames a~d, more ~ener­
ally, to their interpretations' 'authority' .119 As a res.ult,. they have rel~ed on the~r past 
interpretations of the Covenants as if they were bin.ding; The IC~ 1ts~l.f cons1d~red 
that the Committees' interpretations should be ascribed great weight in the Diallo 
case. The reasons it gave were that the States parties have establishe~ inde~e~dent 
bodies to interpret the Covenants on the one hand, and that granting thetr inter-
pretations special weight would serve the goals of 'clarity', 'consistency', and 'legal 
security' on the other. 120 It is difficult, however, to see how the latter could amount 
to an argument in the absence of the former: it is the interpretative authority of t~e 
Committees that seems to be key. Curiously, however, no argument to that effect ts 
to be found in the ICJ's decision. 
116 See eg Nicole Roughan, 'From Authority to Authorities: Bridging the ~ormative/S.ociological 
Divide', in Roger Cotterrell and Maksymilian Del Mar (eds), Authority m Transnational Legal 
Theory: Theorising across Disciplines (Edward Elgar 2016) 280. 
111 See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986) 65. . . . 
118 See eg Gerald L Neuman, 'Giving Meaning and Effect to Human Rights: The Contnbunons of 
Human Rights Committee Members' , Chapter 3 in this volume. 
119 See HRC, 'General Comment 33' (2009) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/33, para 13- 14. 
120 See !CJ, Diallo (n 76) 664. 
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Among the interna.tion~l !aw argum~nts brought so far in favour of the binding 
nature of the Committees 1~terpretat1ons, one could mention the responsibility 
argument (under ICCPR amcle 2(2) and (3)) and the 'quasi-judiciality' argument. 
The former begs the question of why the Committees' interpretation of the sec-
ondary duties of responsibility, which arise for States anyway, actually binds, and the 
latter begs the ques~ion of what makes a finding a 'judgment', and thus binding, in 
the first ~la~e. A .third argu~ent put forward is that of States' 'subsequent practice', 
whether it is validated qua mterpretation of the Covenants under the conditions 
of article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)121 
o: ar.ises qua customary inte1:nati~~al law no~m. This is not an argument for the 
bmdmg nature of the Committees mterpretat1ons, however; it merely grounds the 
separate authority of the latter's content in another source oflaw: States' consensual 
practice or custom. 122 The question of the authority of the Committees and their 
interpretations remains open as a result. 
It i.s here t~at co~parative. international human rights law can help us map State 
practice and 1dent1fy the existence of a potential transnational consensus in that 
practice that is sufficiently common to become either a ground for an evolutive in-
terpret~tion .o~ the trea~ or a new custom pertaining to the binding nature of the 
Committees mterpretat10ns. What the five reports show is that the Committees' 
interp.retations are increasingly treated as part of Covenant law (and not only when 
these mterpretations are grounded in States' subsequent practice or custom, as ex-
pl~ined a~o~e), and. that this ap~lies particularly to concluding observations and 
y1ews. This 1s especially the case m States that have ratified regional human rights 
mstruments and acceded to the jurisdiction of their respective courts, since the latter 
sys~ematically in~lu~e the Committees' interpretations in their interpretations of 
their own respective mstruments. 
V. Three Proposals for Enhancing the Legitimacy 
of the Committees' Interpretations 
If the argument proposed in the previous section is correct, and the Committees' in-
terpretations c~n ?ind, their prac~ice needs to change also with respect to legitimacy. 
I~de~d, establishmg the authonty of the Committees' interpretations and their 
?m~mg nature under .i~ternational law does not yet imply that their authority is 
JUSt1fied an? hence !eg1t1mate. Of course, because the Committees lacked authority 
for a long time, their cone.er~ for legitimacy was limited. This has even arguably led 
to the converse paradox: 1t 1s because the Committees did not care enough about 
. 
121 Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties (VCLD (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered 
mto force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331. 
122 This ma~ e~plain the confusion of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESC~) pertammg to w~ose subsequent practice should matter under VCLT art 31(3)(b): its own 
or State~ . ,See eg CESCR, General Comment 19' (2008) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/19, para 53a; Daniel 
Moeckl1, Interpretation of the ICESCR: Between Morality and State Consent', Chapter 4 in this 
volume. 
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justifying (the authority of) their interpretations that these were not considered 
as binding by States until recently. As a result, the time has come to think about 
justifying the Committees' interpretations, and the present comparative study .of 
the influence of the Covenants, with its transregional focus, is a good opportumty 
to do so. 
This section makes three interrelated proposals regarding the Committees' future 
practice in this respect: it should take subsidiarity more seriously (V.A); in order 
to do so, it should resort to comparison to identify a transnational human rights 
consensus on Covenant law (V.B); and, finally, it should make the most of regional 
mechanisms for the identification of that consensus (V.C). 
A. The role of subsidiarity in Covenant law 
A way to justify the authority of the Committees' interpretations of the Covenants 
could be to respect a core principle of international human rights law: human rights 
subsidiarity. 
A descriptive survey of international human rights law shows that subsidiarity is 
usually approached as a two-sided principle: States have the primary responsibility 
to secure human rights protection, including through judicial review, and inter-
national human rights bodies or courts have a complementary review power in cases 
where international minimal standards are not effectively protected domestically.
123 
More specifically, the survey reveals three types of human rights subsidiarity: 'pro-
cedural', when it pertains to the actual power of the international human rights 
court or body to review (eg exhaustion of domestic remedies); 'substantive', when 
it qualifies the intensity of that review (eg the fourth instance doctrine, the margin 
of appreciation, or the principle of favour); and 'remedial', when it pertains to the 
scope of review (eg the restitutio in integrum principle). 124 
If the principle of subsidiarity so described is very much at the core of regional 
international human rights regimes, the same cannot yet be said about the Covenants 
and the Committees' practice. Interestingly, it is within judicialized international 
human rights law regimes, and hence the regional ones, like the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with its Court, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), or the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, 
with its Court, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), that one 
encounters all three types of human rights subsidiarity. In the universal international 
human rights regimes, by contrast, the rule seems to be, first of all, that the less insti-
tutionalized they are, the less frequently subsidiarity is invoked and respected. Thus, 
while some forms of subsidiarity may be identified in the practice of UN human 
rights treaty bodies, very few subsidiarity requirements subsist in the individual 
123 See eg the prevailing approach under the law of the European Convention on Human Ri~hts 
law (ECtHR, 'Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided Coin?' (2015) ECtHR Backgroun~ paper <www.echr.coe.mt/ 
Documents/Seminar_background_paper_2015_ENG.pdf> accessed 1Apnl2017, 1). . 
124 For a full argument, see Samantha Besson, 'Subsidiarity in International Human Rights 
Law: What is Subsidiary about Human Rights?' (2016) 61 American J ofJurisprudence 69. 
266 The Influence of the Two Covenants on States Parties Across Regions 
procedures before the Human Rights Council. A second observation is that, even 
before human rights treaty bodies like the two Committees, if procedural subsidi-
arity is usually respected, this is not the case for substantive subsidiarity, or then only 
in a very limited fashion to the extent that there is no clear reference to the notion 
of 'margin of appreciation'; 125 this is also not the case for remedial subsidiarity given 
the frequent prescription of individual or general measures as remedies. 
Claiming authority for the Committees' interpretations comes at a price, how-
ever: they should endeavour to respect the principle of human rights subsidiarity 
in order to justify the authority of their interpretations and secure their legitimacy. 
In international human rights law, subsidiarity amounts to the justification for the 
complementary review and interpretation power of international human rights 
bodies or courts. 126 
Justifications of human rights subsidiarity itself are two-fold: epistemic and 
democratic. This has been confirmed by the ECtHR, which refers to domestic au-
thorities' being 'better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs 
and conditions', on the one hand, and to reasonable disagreement and the special 
weight that should be given to the democratically-elected domestic policy-maker, 
on the other. 127 The epistemic justification of subsidiarity is to be found in the con-
crete nature of human rights duties, whose content can only be specified by refer-
ence to threats existing in domestic circumstances. The democratic justification of 
human rights subsidiarity is egalitarian and pertains to the protection of the political 
equality of individuals in the specification of their respective human rights and du-
ties through domestic democracy. 128 
If the Committees are to develop a more rigorous practice of substantive subsidi-
arity, they will need a test to apply in this regard. In regional human rights law, the 
test used for human rights subsidiarity is the effectiveness of domestic protection of 
the minimal international standard of human rights. The ECtHR and the IACtHR 
have developed the criteria of transnational consensus, 'common ground', or 'con-
verging approach' to identify what constitutes that minimal standard of human 
rights protection across the States parties and to determine the corresponding degree 
of scrutiny applicable to a given domestic measure. Regrettably, this is not the sole 
test at play in these courts' reasoning when setting the margin of appreciation, how-
ever, and its application remains largely unpredictable as a result. Nevertheless, there 
are ways for the transnational consensus test to be streamlined and generalized as a 
test for substantive subsidiarity in international human rights law. 
Referring to democratic consensus as constitutive of a minimal standard of human 
rights protection ties into the democratic justification of human rights subsidiarity. 
Importantly, however, the existence or absence of democratic consensus should only 
125 See eg HRC, 'General Comment 34' (2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34, para 36. 
126 See eg David Szymczak, 'Rapport introductif: Le principe de subsidiarite clans tous ses etats' in 
Frederic Sudre (ed), Le principe de subsidiarite au sens du droit de /,a Convention europeenne des droits de 
l'homme (Anthemis 2014) 15, 27. 
127 See ECtHR, SAS vFrance,App no 43835/11, 1July2014, para 129. 
128 See Samantha Besson, 'The Egalitarian Dimension of Human Rights' (2012) 136 Archiv Rir 
Sozial- und Rechtsphilosophie Beiheft 19. 
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work as a test for the margin of appreciation within the limits of the democratic jus-
tification of subsidiarity itself, that is, provided non-discrimination rights and the 
fundamental core of human rights are not infringed. 
Of course, some may object that not all States parties to the Covenants are demo-
cratic, and that this jeopardizes the democratic argument for applying human 
rights subsidiarity to the Committees' power of review and to the latter's intensity 
and scope. This democratic objection applies from the perspective of both non-
democratic States and democratic States. 
With respect to the former, this is a false problem given that, under international 
human rights law, all States have to be democratic as much as they have to respect 
human rights. It is unclear, therefore, why the lack of democratic legitimacy of 
minimal international democratic and human rights standards should worry the 
people of a non-democratic State that is not yet abiding by either of these standards. 
Secondly, regarding the impact on democratic States and their populations, the con-
cern may also be put aside. When a State has not ensured sufficient democratic de-
liberation in a given human rights case, its margin of appreciation should be limited 
and subsidiarity sidestepped because the conditions for the latter, that is, domestic 
deliberation and reason-giving, are not fulfilled. 129 Non-democratic States should 
not be allowed to contribute further, for instance through the consolidation of their 
respective human rights practice into the transnational human rights consensus, 
to the development of the minimal international human rights standard that also 
amounts to a minimal democratic standard constraining democratic States parties 
in return. 130 
B. The role of comparison and transnational consensus in Covenant law 
If transnational human rights consensus is to become the test for substantive subsidi-
arity, and for States' margin of appreciation under Covenant law, the Committees 
should generalize their recourse to comparative international human rights law. 
Comparison is the main method available to international human rights bodies and 
courts in order to identify a common ground or consensus in States' human rights 
practice. 
The importance of comparison in international human rights law becomes clear 
once the duality of the domestic-international regime of human rights law is fully 
understood. 131 One of human rights law's features, indeed, is the transnational 
129 See also Andreas follesdal, 'Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation' in Adam Etinson (ed), 
Human Rights: Moral or Political? (OUP 2018). 
130 For a full argument, see Besson, 'Transnational Constitutional Law' (n 40). It ":'ould be paradox-
ical indeed to insist, on the one hand, on participatory grounds, that all non-democratic States should be 
included in the determination of international human rights law and hence in the transnational human 
rights consensus, while, on the o~er, refusin~ at a later st~ge to take that.consensus seriously becau~e it is 
dominated or tainted by so-called pretenders and could impose parochial conceptions of human nghts. 
See also Heyns and Killander, 'Universality' (n 22) 673-74. . , 
131 See also Gerald L Neuman 'Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance 
(2003) 55 Stanford L Rev 1863. 
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nature of its sources, be they international or domestic.132 Domestic and inter-
national legal norms protecting human rights relate in a way that is uncommon 
in international law: they are not only situated in a relationship of top-down en-
forcement of an international standard in domestic law, but also in a relationship 
of bottom-up international recognition of the common law stemming from dif-
ferent domestic legal orders and of its progressive consolidation into a minimal 
international human rights standard. Because this transnational minimal standard, 
once it has been entrenched, requires the same level of transnational commonality 
to evolve one way or the other, levelling-down is rare in practice. Moreover, as ex-
plained before, only the domestic human rights practices regarded as minimally 
democratic according to the common standards entrenched in international human 
rights law may and should be considered in the further transnational development 
of this minimal international human rights standard. 
Again, justifications for this transnational process of human rights law-making 
are both democratic and epistemic. The moral epistemology of human rights is 
social and reflexive, 133 and this requires that human rights first be identified in the 
socio-political context in which they are already protected in substance, that is, do-
mestically and democratically, followed by international recognition to protect and 
entrench these epistemic egalitarian constraints. 
Of course, some may object to this justification of transnational human rights 
law-making on grounds of the universality of (minimal) international human rights 
law. The problem is that international human rights law itself may be criticized for 
its lack of universality. The parochialism objection is indeed usually raised in op-
position to the claimed universality of international human rights law and based 
on what it regards as the largely parochial conceptions of these rights stemming 
from one dominant culture and imposed on others in the name of universality. 134 
In reply to this objection, one may therefore argue that the transnational making 
of human rights law actually amounts to a way of preventing parochial conceptions 
from being too quickly entrenched into international human rights law. Starting 
from many distinct domestic human rights interpretations and comparing them 
on a transnational scale in order to identify common ground can contribute to 
questioning the future international human rights standard and hence to making 
it less parochial. This is not to say that there are no epistemic qualities in existing 
international human rights institutions, such as for example their inclusiveness, 
representativeness, or deliberativeness, 135 but only that the latter are actually best 
understood as complementary and transnational in their functioning rather than 
unilateral and top-down. 
132 For a full argument, see Besson, 'Transnational Constitutional Law' (n 40). 
.
133 See Allen.Buch~nan, 'The Reflexive Social Moral Epistemology of Human Rights' in Miranda 
Fncker (ed), Soc1alEp1stemology (2018) forthcoming. 
. 
134 See Samantha Besson, 'Justifications' in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, and Sandesh 
S1vakurnaran (eds), International Human Rights Law (3rd edn, OUP 2017) 22. 
135 See Allen Buchanan, 'Human Rights and the Legitimacy of the International Order' (2008) 14 
Legal Theory 39. 
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The transnationality of human rights law, thus understood and justified, ex-
plains the specific function comparative law plays or should play in domestic136 and 
international human rights reasoning, a role very different from that of scholarly 
comparisons or one-to-one judicial references. 137 If there is comparison in the con-
temporary dual human rights regime, it is because human rights law claims to be 
transnational and hence universal and shares a common ground. It is not merely be-
cause it is interesting, or even strategic, to compare domestic practices, for instance 
to clarify certain constitutional concepts. 
What this means for the Committees is that they should resort more systematic-
ally to comparative international human rights reasoning by comparing the.vario.us 
domestic practices pertaining to Covenant rights and try, more regularly, to 1dent1fy 
a transnational consensus. 138 Arguably, this is already the way in which State prac-
tice becomes consolidated into Covenant law as subsequent State practice in the 
Committees' concluding observations139 and then reimposed as such onto States 
thanks to the perpetuation of this transnational human rights law-making cycle 
over time.14o To that extent, the way in which the Covenants' interpretation is de-
veloped is already truly transnational. It is important, however, to ~ake this pro.cess 
even more comparative, and in particular to extend that human nghts comparison 
into the other procedures whereby Covenant law is interpreted, such as General 
Comments and individual Views. 
Resorting to human rights comparison would enable the Committe~s to comply 
more strictly with the conditions ofVCLT article 31 (3)(b) when they interpret the 
Covenants by reference to subsequent State practice; this method implies substan-
tiating State practice and assessing whether it reveals a new agreement. The fact that 
domestic institutions, and especially domestic courts, increasingly resort to com-
parative human rights law (across domestic human rights law rules, but also between 
the various universal and regional regimes of human rights law) could, of course, be 
of great help to the Committees in this comparative endeavour and should be en-
couraged on the same grounds. 
C. The role of regions and regional human rights 
regimes under Covenant law 
Pursuing human rights comparison, and especially identifying a transnational con-
sensus on that basis, may be more difficult on the Covenants' universal scale than on 
the regional level. This may explain why the minimal human ri~hts standard u~der 
Covenant law has overall been thinner in scope than under regional human nghts 
136 See Jeremy Waldron, 'Rights and the Citation of Foreign Law' in Torn Campbell, KO Ewing, 
and Adam Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (OUP 20~ I) 410, ~2.3. 
137 See eg Christopher McCrudden, 'Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Jud1c1al 
Conversations on Constitutional Rights' (2000) 20 OJLS 499. , , 
138 See Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42), on the use of the term consensus· 
139 See eg CESCR 'Report on the Seventh Session' (23 November-I I December 1992) UN DocE/ 
1993/22, para 32 and 49. 
140 See also Moeckli, 'Interpretation' (n 122) . 
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regimes. Clearly, however, identifying such a universal transnational human rights 
consensus is not impossible. As a matter of fact, comparing human rights practice 
across regions rather than States may ease the process. Looking for regional human 
rights consensuses may be a good way to promote, at an intermediary level, the con-
solidation of a universal consensus around interpretations of Covenant rights. 
Various general arguments for the beneficial role of regional human rights law re-
garding the influence of the Covenants in domestic law have been mentioned in this 
study, including the supranational judicial remedies available under these regimes 
and their integration rules (Section III). These benefits were confirmed by the re-
gional reports corresponding to the four regions, out of the five studied, that have re-
gional human rights instruments in place. From a broader perspective, and to quote 
Gerald L Neuman, one may make three arguments for the adoption of regional 
human rights regimes: trust, effectiveness, and expertise. 141 Regional human rights 
bodies staffed by neighbour States' nationals are more likely to be trusted in adju-
dicating and interpreting human rights than universal ones like the Committees, 
more likely to be effective in the authority they claim and in enforcing human rights, 
and likely to know better how to interpret human rights in domestic circumstances. 
The Asian report actually emphasizes Asian States' distrust of the distant universal 
human rights machinery in charge of monitoring conformity with the ICCPR. 142 
As a matter of fact, some developments towards the establishment of a new regional 
human rights regime are now observed in that region too. 143 
Importantly, nothing in these arguments for the development of regional human 
rights instruments should be interpreted to mean that universal human rights in-
struments like the Covenants and their monitoring by the Committees would be 
dispensable, provided regional instruments were in place universally and inclusive 
of all States in every region. 
Of course, for the reasons mentioned above, regional human rights instruments 
and especially regional human rights bodies have been easier to set up and sustain. 
History confirms that regional regimes were put in place first or, at least, to a greater 
institutional depth, and especially that they were the first ones to be judicialized. 
This affects the comparative advantages of both systems today and how they have 
grown to coexist through that differentiation. One may mention, for instance, the 
differences between the kinds of human rights they protect, between the thickness of 
the minimal consensus they reveal on these rights, and, finally, between the kinds of 
international remedies they provide, and especially whether these remedies are gen-
eral and political (eg State reporting) and/or individual and judicial (eg individual 
applications). 
All the same, contemporary fears that regional human rights systems could dis-
place the universal human rights system, or at least undermine it, are wrong. 144 
141 See Neuman, 'Import, Export, and Regional Consent' (n 7) 106; Heyns and Killander, 
'Universality' (n 22) 673. 
142 See Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). 
143 ibid. See Heyns and Killander, 'Universality' (n 22) 69lff. 
144 See, however, Heyns and Killander, 'Universality' (n 22) 674, 695. 
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With respect to the former concern, one should stress that (domestic and regional) 
human rights law's claim to universality implies the coexistence of a (minimal) uni-
versal international human rights standard, at least qua general principles or cus-
tomary law. As a result, there could be no regional human rights law without a 
universal human rights regime. A confirmation of this form of epistemic discipline 
generated by the universality of international human rights law may be found in 
regional human rights courts' interpretations. The second concern may also be set 
aside to the extent that, based on the arguments put forward earlier in this chapter, 
it is unclear why regional human rights law and institutions should necessarily be 
less democratic and more epistemically parochial than universal ones. Even if they 
were, the inherent democratic and egalitarian limitations placed on States' margin of 
appreciation, the international entrenchment of the minimal transnational human 
rights standard that requires an equivalent universal transnational human rights 
consensus to be amended, and, finally, the reflexive benefits of transnational human 
rights comparison within a region would all prevent a regional human rights system 
whose guarantees allegedly fall below the threshold of the minimal international 
human rights standard from being invoked to derogate from the latter and to level 
it down. 
Among the specific arguments one may give for the contribution of regional 
human rights regimes to the identification of a regional human rights consensus 
and, accordingly, to the consolidation of a universal consensus on Covenant rights, 
one should, of course, mention the evidence that stems from the existing regimes. 145 
What the four regional reports show is that regional human rights regimes have led 
to the development, over time, of common political or constitutional traits146 in 
domestic human rights practice. As a matter of fact, the Asian report confirms that 
commonalities can also be identified in Asia despite the absence of a regional human 
rights instrument. 147 
Accordingly, the Committees should encourage regional human rights protection 
and interpretations, and, in regions where these are not present, require States to re-
sort more regularly to regional comparisons and to the identification of a regional 
consensus. This could, in turn, enable the Committees, in their own reasoning, to 
distinguish the claims before them from those addressed by regional courts and, 
when available, to rely on one or more regional consensuses. This could then fa-
cilitate the identification of a transnational consensus on Covenant rights based on 
commonalities between regional human rights consensuses. This comparison and 
search for consensus should, of course, be done in an inclusive and universal way 
to avoid privileging some States or some regions over others and developing a paro-
chial interpretation of the Covenants. 148 From an institutional perspective, this may 
imply restructuring the Committees to create regional rapporteurs, to devolve some 
145 See Neuman, 'Import, Export, and Regional Consent' (n 7). 
146 See Pinto and Sigal, 'Latin America' (n 42) . 147 See Tyagi, 'Asia' (n 24). 
148 See eg Gerald L Neuman, 'Standing Alone or Together: The Human Rights Committee's 
Decision in AP v Russian Federation' in Eva Brems and Ellen Desmet (eds), Integrated Human Rights in 
Practice: Rewriting Human Rights Decisiom (Edward Elgar 2017). 
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of their work to regional sub-committees, or, at least, to hold regional meetings. 149 
In this respect, an important contribution of better consideration of regional human 
rights law in the Committees' deliberations could be to compensate for the lack of 
proportionate representation of the regions in the Committees' membership. 
Provided they can identify a transregional consensus on a given Covenant right 
through comparison, the Committees should demonstrate some deference to that 
consensus and enforce it through their interpretations of States' duties. In other 
cases, they should grant States parties a broad margin of appreciation. Importantly, 
within these boundaries, the existence of a transnational human rights consensus 
would not pre-empt the Committees' power to review and interpret Covenant 
rights. 150 
A separate and difficult question pertains to the relationship, in case of contra-
diction, between distinct regional human rights 'consensuses', on the one hand, and 
between (some of) them and the universal human rights consensus, on the other. 
In circumstances of reasonable disagreement, one should expect that the respective 
consensuses could diverge. 
Regarding the former kind of conflict, first of all, the democratic and epistemic 
justifications of transnational human rights law point to the priority of the common 
ground identified in the relevant region. The existence of these contradictions 
should, however, remind regional human rights courts of the importance of sub-
jecting their interpretations to comparative revision and of their necessary corrigi-
bility. Such conflicts should not be all too common, however. 151 Indeed, existing 
regional human rights regimes have adopted a universalizing approach to the identi-
fication of their respective regional human rights consensuses. 152 From the perspec-
tive of the Committees, the identification of such conflicts between regional human 
rights consensuses should be taken as a signal in the identification of a potential 
universal and transnational human rights consensus. 
With respect to the conflict between regional and universal human rights con-
sensuses, second, priorities are more difficult to draw. Of course, much of the time, 
regional consensuses are thicker than the universal one and, if conflicts arise, they 
fall within the thinner scope of the latter only. However, even in that context, such 
conflicts should not be all too common. Indeed, as explained, existing regional 
human rights regimes have adopted a universalizing discipline in the identification 
of their regional human rights consensuses, and have integrated the Committees' in-
terpretations of the Covenants into the interpretation of the American, African, and 
149 See Heyns and Viljoen, 'The Impact' (n 17) 513. 
15° Comparing human rights and identifying a transnational human rights consensus should not, 
therefore, be equated with requiring the Committees to adopt the lowest minimal common standard 
shared by States across regions. For a full argument for the authority of comparative human rights law 
and especially of the transnational and transregional human rights consensus, see Samantha Besson, 
'Comparative Law and Human Rights' in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Oxford 
Handbook on Comparative Law (2nd edn, OUP 2018) forthcoming. 
l 5 l See Heyns and Killander, 'Universality' (n 22) 688ff. 
152 See eg DemirandBaykara v Turkey App no 34503/97 (ECtHR, 12 November 2008) para 85. 
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even European instruments. 153 The Committees have also shown a lot of deference 
to regional human rights consensus, especially when it is transregional1 54-albeit 
not always by referring expressly to its comparative sources or distinguishing be-
tween them. 155 Of course, there are many other reasons for convergence between 
the Committees and regional human rights courts. 156 
In the rare cases in which conflicts between regional and universal consensuses 
arise, however, the relationship between the respective consensuses cannot be one 
of subsidiarity; subsidiarity is justified on democratic grounds and only applies be-
tween domestic democratic and international human rights law. This is why the 
favour clause cannot apply either.157 Some human rights scholars have criticized 
this lack of coherence in international human rights law. 158 This risk of fragmenta-
tion is usually addressed by reference to international law's rules on conflicts, and in 
particular to the idea of systemic interpretation (VCLT article 31 (3)(c)). 159 In the 
case of conflicts between regional and universal human rights interpretations, one 
should add that they share a common universality in the human rights duties they 
impose; this is what should guide their respective interpretations. 
VI. Conclusions 
The transregional scope of this study has provided a unique opportunity to confirm 
the role of regional human rights instruments and bodies in international human 
rights law descriptively, but also to argue normatively for their justification from ~he 
perspective of the universality of human rights. It has also shown why comfarat1ve 
international human rights law amounts to much more than a scholarly project and 
should become a more integral part of the practice of international human rights 
law, including in the Committees' reasoning. 
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